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Abstract—Protected database search systems cryptographically
isolate the roles of reading from, writing to, and administering the
database. This separation limits unnecessary administrator access
and protects data in the case of system breaches. Since protected
search was introduced in 2000, the area has grown rapidly;
systems are offered by academia, start-ups, and established
companies.
However, there is no best protected search system or set of
techniques. Design of such systems is a balancing act between
security, functionality, performance, and usability. This challenge
is made more difficult by ongoing database specialization, as
some users will want the functionality of SQL, NoSQL, or
NewSQL databases. This database evolution will continue, and
the protected search community should be able to quickly provide
functionality consistent with newly invented databases.
At the same time, the community must accurately and clearly
characterize the tradeoffs between different approaches. To ad-
dress these challenges, we provide the following contributions:
1) An identification of the important primitive operations
across database paradigms. We find there are a small
number of base operations that can be used and combined
to support a large number of database paradigms.
2) An evaluation of the current state of protected search
systems in implementing these base operations. This evalu-
ation describes the main approaches and tradeoffs for each
base operation. Furthermore, it puts protected search in
the context of unprotected search, identifying key gaps in
functionality.
3) An analysis of attacks against protected search for different
base queries.
4) A roadmap and tools for transforming a protected search
system into a protected database, including an open-source
performance evaluation platform and initial user opinions
of protected search.
Index Terms—searchable symmetric encryption, property pre-
serving encryption, database search, oblivious random access
memory, private information retrieval
I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of collecting, storing, and sharing data is
widely recognized by governments [1], companies [2], [3],
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and individuals [4]. When these are done properly, tremendous
value can be extracted from data, enabling better decisions,
improved health, economic growth, and the creation of entire
industries and capabilities.
Important and sensitive data are stored in database manage-
ment systems (DBMSs), which support ingest, storage, search,
and retrieval, among other functionality. DBMSs are vital to
most businesses and are used for many different purposes. We
distinguish between the core database, which provides mecha-
nisms for efficiently indexing and searching over dynamic data,
and the DBMS, which is software that accesses data stored in
a database. A database’s primary purpose is efficient storage
and retrieval of data. DBMSs perform many other functions
as well: enforcing data access policies, defining data struc-
tures, providing external applications with strong transaction
guarantees, serving as building blocks in complex applications
(such as visualization and data presentation), replicating data,
integrating disparate data sources, and backing up important
sources. Recently introduced DBMSs also perform analytics
on stored data. We concentrate on the database’s core functions
of data insertion, indexing, and search.
As the scale, value, and centralization of data increase, so
too do security and privacy concerns. There is demonstrated
risk that the data stored in databases will be compromised.
Nation-state actors target other governments’ systems, cor-
porate repositories, and individual data for espionage and
competitive advantages [5]. Criminal groups create and use
underground markets to buy and sell stolen personal informa-
tion [6]. Devastating attacks occur against government [7] and
commercial [8] targets.
Protected database search technology cryptographically
separates the roles of providing, administering, and accessing
data. It reduces the risks of a data breach, since the server(s)
hosting the database can no longer access data contents.
Whereas most traditional databases require the server to be
able to read all data contents in order to perform fast search
and retrieval, protected search technology uses cryptographic
techniques on data that is encrypted or otherwise encoded, so
that the server can quickly answer queries without being able
to read the plaintext data.
A. Protected Search Systems Today
Protected database search has reached an inflection point in
maturity. In 2000, Song, Wagner, and Perrig provided the first
scheme with communication proportional to the description
of the query and the server performing (roughly) a linear
scan of the encrypted database [9]. Building on this, the field
quickly moved from theoretical interest to the design and
implementation of working systems.
Protected database search solutions encompass a wide vari-
ety of cryptographic techniques, including property-preserving
encryption [10], searchable symmetric encryption [11], private
information retrieval by keyword [12], and techniques from
oblivious random access memory (ORAM) [13]. Like the
cryptographic elements used in their construction, protected
search systems provide provable security based on the hardness
of certain computational problems. Provable security comes
with several other benefits: a rigorous definition of security,
a thorough description of protocols, and a clear statement of
assumptions.
Many of these systems have been implemented. Protected
search implementations have been tested and found to scale
moderately well, reporting performance results on datasets of
billions of records [14]–[22].
In the commercial space, a number of established and
startup companies offer products with protected search func-
tionality, including Bitglass [23], Ciphercloud [24], Cipher-
Query [25], Crypteron [26], IQrypt [27], Kryptnostic [28],
Google’s Encrypted BigQuery [29], Microsoft’s SQL Server
2016 [30], Azure SQL Database [31], PreVeil [32], Sky-
high [33], StealthMine [34], and ZeroDB [35]. While not
all commercial systems have undergone thorough security
analysis, their core ideas come from published work. For
this reason, this paper focuses on systems with a published
description.
Designing a protected search system is a balance between
security, functionality, performance, and usability. Security
descriptions focus on the information that is revealed, or
leaked, to an attacker with access to the database server.
Functionality is primarily characterized by the query types
that a protected database can answer. Queries are usually
expressed in a standard language such as the structured query
language (SQL). Performance and usability are affected by the
database’s data structures and indexing mechanisms, as well
as required computational and network cost.
There are a wide range of protected database systems that
are appropriate for different applications. With such a range
of choices, it is natural to ask: Are there solutions for every
database setting? If so, which solution is best?
B. Our Contribution
The answers to these questions are complex. Protected
search replicates the functionality of some database paradigms,
but the unprotected database landscape is diverse and rapidly
changing. Even for database paradigms with mature protected
search solutions, making an informed choice requires under-
standing the tradeoffs.
The goal of this work is twofold: first, to inform protected
search designers on the current and future state of database
technology, enabling focus on techniques that will be useful
in future DBMSs, and second, to help security and database
experts understand the tradeoffs between protected search
systems so they can make an informed decision about which
technology, if any, is most appropriate for their setting.
We accomplish these goals with the following contributions:
1) A characterization of database search functionality
in terms of base and combined queries. Traditional
databases efficiently answer a small number of queries,
called a basis. Other queries are answered by combining
these basis operations [36]. Protected search systems
have implicitly followed this basis and combination
approach.
Although there are many database paradigms, the num-
ber of distinct bases of operations is small. We advocate
for explicitly adopting this basis and combination ap-
proach.
2) An identification of the bases of current protected search
systems and black-box ways to combine basis queries
to achieve richer functionality. We then put protected
search in the context of unprotected search by identify-
ing basis functions currently unaddressed by protected
search systems.
3) An evaluation of current attacks that exploit leakage of
various protected search approaches to learn sensitive
information. This gives a snapshot of the current security
of available base queries.
4) A roadmap and tools for transforming a protected search
system into a protected DBMS capable of deployment.
We present an open-source software package developed
by our team that aids with performance evaluation; our
tool has evaluated protected search at the scale of 10TB
of data. We also present preliminary user opinions of
protected search. Lastly, we summarize systems that
have made the transition to full systems, and we chal-
lenge other designers to think in terms of full DBMS
functionality.
C. Organization
The remainder of this work is organized as follows:
Section II introduces background on databases and protected
search systems, Section III describes protected search base
queries and leakage attacks against these queries, Section IV
describes techniques for combining base queries and discusses
remaining functionality gaps, Section V shows how to trans-
form from queries to a full system, and Section VI concludes.
II. OVERVIEW OF DATABASE SYSTEMS
This section provides background on the databases and
protected search systems that we study in this paper. We
first describe unprotected database paradigms and their query
bases. Next we define the types of users and operations of
a database. We then describe the protected search problem,
including its security goals and the security imperfections
known as leakage that schemes may exhibit. Finally, we give
examples of common leakage functions found in the literature.
A. Database Definition and Evolution
A database is a partially-searchable, dynamic data store that
is optimized to respond to targeted queries (e.g., those that
return less than 5% of the total data). Database servers respond
to queries through a well established API. Databases typically
perform search operations in time sublinear in the database
size due to the use of parallel architectures or data structures
such as binary trees and B-trees.
Several styles of database engines have evolved over the past
few decades. Relational or SQL-style databases dominated the
database market from the 1970s to the 1990s. Over the past
decade, there has been a focus on databases systems that sup-
port many sizes of data management workloads [37]. NoSQL
and NewSQL have emerged as new database paradigms,
gaining traction in the database market [38], [39].
1) SQL: Relational databases (often called SQL databases)
typically provide strong transactional guarantees and have
a well known interface. Relational databases are vertically
scalable: they achieve better performance through greater hard-
ware resources. SQL databases comply with ACID (Atomicity,
Consistency, Isolation, and Durability) requirements [40].
2) NoSQL: NoSQL (short for “not only SQL”) databases
emerged in the mid 2000s. NoSQL optimizes the architec-
ture for fast data ingest, flexible data structures, and relaxed
transactional guarantees [41]. These changes were made to ac-
commodate increasing amounts of unstructured data. NoSQL
databases, for the most part, excel at horizontal scaling and
when data models closely align with future computation.
3) NewSQL: NewSQL systems bring together the scalabil-
ity of NoSQL databases and the transactional guarantees of
relational databases [42]. Several NewSQL variants are being
developed, such as in-memory databases that closely resemble
the data models and programming interface of SQL databases,
and array data stores that are optimized for numerical data
analysis.
4) Future Systems: We expect the proliferation of cus-
tomized engines that are tuned to perform a relatively small
set of operations efficiently. While these systems will have
different characteristics, we believe that each system will
efficiently implement a small set of basis operations. There are
several federated or polystore systems being developed [43]–
[45].
The heterogeneous nature of current and future databases
demands a variety of protected search systems. While provid-
ing such variety is challenging, there are a small number of
base operations that can be combined to provide much of the
functionality of the aforementioned systems.
B. Query Bases
To reduce the space of possible queries that must be
secured, we borrow an approach from developers of software
specifications and mathematical libraries [46]. In these fields,
it is common to determine a core set of low-level kernels and
then express other operations using these kernels. Similarly,
many database technologies have a query basis: a small set
of base operations that can be combined to provide complex
search functionality. Furthermore, multiple technologies share
the same query basis. In some cases the basis was not explicit
in the original design but was formalized in later work. Apache
Accumulo’s native API does not have a rigorous mathematical
design, but frameworks such as D4M [47], [48] and Pig [49]
used to manipulate data in Accumulo do.
Leveraging an underlying query basis will allow the pro-
tected search community to keep pace with new database
systems. We discuss three bases found in database systems.
First, relational algebra forms the backbone of many SQL
and NewSQL systems [42]. Second, associative arrays provide
a mathematical basis for SQL, NoSQL, and NewSQL sys-
tems [50]. Third, linear algebraic operations form a basis for
some NewSQL databases. These bases and database paradigms
are summarized in Table I.
1) Relational Algebra: Relational algebra, proposed by
Codd in 1970 as a model for SQL [36], consists of the fol-
lowing primitives: set union, set difference, Cartesian product
(joins), projection, and selection. Complex queries can typi-
cally be generated by composing these operations. Relational
algebra and the composability of operations allow a server-
side query planner to optimize query execution by rearranging
operations to still produce the same result [68].
2) Associative Arrays: Associative arrays are a mathe-
matical basis for several styles of database engines [50].
They provide a mathematical foundation for key-value store
NoSQL databases. Associative array algebra consists of the
following base operations: construction, find, associative array
addition, associative array element-wise multiplication, and
array multiplication [47]. Associative arrays are built on top of
the algebraic concept of a semiring (a ring without an additive
inverse). Addition or multiplication in an associative array can
denote any two binary operations from an algebraic semiring.
Usually, these two operations are the traditional × and +, but
in the min-plus algebra the two operations are min and + (in
the max-plus algebra the two operations are max and +).
3) Linear Algebra: A number of newer NewSQL databases
support linear algebraic operations. GraphBLAS is a current
standardization effort underway for graph algorithms [69].
In GraphBLAS, graph data is stored using sparse matrices,
and the linear algebraic base operations of construction, find,
matrix addition, matrix multiplication, and element-wise mul-
tiplication are composed to create graph algorithms. Examples
of how the GraphBLAS can be applied to popular graph
algorithms are given in [70], [71].
C. Database Roles and Operations
We consider five important database roles, analogous to
roles in database systems like Microsoft SQL Server 2016
[72]:
∙ A provider, who provides and modifies the data.
∙ A querier, who wishes to learn things about the data.
∙ A server, who handles storage and processing.
Query Basis Technology Fundamental characteristics Strengths Weaknesses Examples
Rel. Algebra
Set Union
Set Difference
SQL [36]:
Relational
Transaction support,
ACID guarantees,
Table representation of data
Popular interface,
Common data model [51]
Upfront schema design,
Low insert & query rate
MySQL [52]
Oracle DB [53]
Postgres [54]
Products/Joins
Projection
Selection
NewSQL [42]:
Relational
Use of in-memory,
new system arch.
or simplified data model
Popular interface,
Transactional support,
ACID guarantees
Req. expensive hardware,
Often only relational data
model
Spanner [55]
MemSQL [56]
Spark SQL [57]
Federated [58] Relational model,
Partitioned/replicated tables
Transactional support,
High performance,
ACID guarantees
Upfront schema design,
Often only relational data
model
Garlic [58]
DB2 [59]
Assoc. Array Alg.
Construct
Find
Array (+,×)
Element-wise ×
NoSQL [41]:
Key-value
Horizontal scalability,
Data rep. as key-value pairs,
BASE guarantees [60]
High insert rates,
Cell-level security
Flexible schema
Sacrifice one of the fol-
lowing: consistency, avail-
ability, or partition toler-
ance
BigTable [41]
Accumulo [61]
HBase [62]
mongoDB [63]
Linear Algebra
Construct
Find
Matrix (+,×)
NoSQL [64]:
Graph
Databases
Data represented as adjacency
or incidence matrix,
Horizontal scalability,
Graph operation API
Natural data representation,
Amenable to graph algs.
Performance,
Diverse data models,
Difficult to optimize
Neo4j [64]
System G [65]
Element-wise × NewSQL [66]:
Array
Databases
ACID guarantees,
Data represented as arrays
(dense or sparse)
High performance,
Transactional support,
Good for scientific comp.
Data model restrictions,
Lack of iterator support
SciDB [66]
TileDB [67]
Multiple bases Polystore [43] Disparate DBMSs High performance,
Flexible data stores,
Diverse data/programming
models
Requires middleware BigDAWG [43]
Myria [45]
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF A (NOT EXHAUSTIVE) SET OF POPULAR CURRENT AND EMERGING QUERY BASES TOGETHER WITH THEIR CORRESPONDING DATABASE
TECHNOLOGIES. CHARACTERISTICS, STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, AND EXAMPLES REFER TO THE TECHNOLOGIES, NOT THE QUERY BASES.
∙ An authorizer, who specifies data- and query-based rules.
∙ An enforcer, who ensures that rules are applied.
Databases provide an expressive language for representing
permissions, or rules. Rules are enforced by authenticating the
roles possessed by a valid user and granting her the appropriate
powers. In general, each user may perform multiple roles, and
each role may be performed by multiple users.
While databases offer a wide range of features, we focus on
four operations: 퐈퐧퐢퐭 ,퐐퐮퐞퐫퐲, 퐔퐩퐝퐚퐭퐞, and 퐑퐞퐟퐫퐞퐬퐡. These op-
erations are common across the database paradigms described
above; we describe them below in the context of protected
search.
∙ 퐈퐧퐢퐭: The initialization protocol occurs between the
provider (who has data to load) and the server. The server
obtains a protected database representing the loaded data.
∙ 퐐퐮퐞퐫퐲: The query protocol occurs between the querier
(with a query), the server (with the protected database),
the enforcer (with the rules), and possibly the provider.
The querier obtains the query results if the rules are
satisfied.
∙ 퐔퐩퐝퐚퐭퐞: The update protocol occurs between the provider
(with a set of updates) and the server. The server obtains
an updated protected database. Updates include insertions,
deletions, and record modifications.
∙ 퐑퐞퐟퐫퐞퐬퐡: The refresh protocol occurs between the
provider and the server. The server obtains a new pro-
tected database that represents the same data but is
designed to achieve better performance and/or security.
All systems considered in this work support 퐈퐧퐢퐭 and 퐐퐮퐞퐫퐲,
but only some systems support 퐔퐩퐝퐚퐭퐞 and 퐑퐞퐟퐫퐞퐬퐡; see
Tables II and V for details.
D. Protected Database Search Systems
Informally, a protected search system is a database system
that supports the roles and operations defined above, in which
each party learns only its intended outputs and nothing else. In
particular, a protected search system aims to ensure that the
server learns nothing about the data stored in the protected
database or about the queries, and the querier learns nothing
beyond the query results. These security goals can be formal-
ized using the real-ideal style of cryptographic definition. In
this paradigm, one imagines an ideal version of a protected
search system, in which a trusted external party performs
storage, queries, and modifications correctly and reveals only
the intended outputs to each party. The real system is said
to be secure if no party can learn more from its real world
interactions than it can learn in the ideal system.
We restrict our attention in this work to protected database
search systems that provide formally defined security guaran-
tees based upon the strength of their underlying cryptographic
primitives. Some of the commercial systems mentioned in the
introduction lack formal security reductions; although they
are based on techniques with proofs of security, analysis is
required to determine whether differences from those proven
techniques affect security.
Scenarios: Only a few existing protected search systems
consider the enforcement of rules (i.e., include an authorizer
and enforcer). Therefore, in this paper we focus primarily on
two scenarios: a three-party scenario comprising a provider,
a querier, and a server, and a two-party scenario in which a
single user acts as both the provider and the querier (we denote
this combined entity as the client). The latter scenario models a
cloud storage outsourcing application in which a client uploads
files to the cloud that she can later request. In the two-party
setting, the client has the right to know all information in the
database so it is only necessary to consider security against an
adversarial server. In this work, we focus on protected search
in the case of a single provider and a single querier; for the
more general setting in which multiple users can perform a
single role, see Section V and [73].
We stress that a secure search system for one scenario does
not automatically extend to another scenario. Additionally,
despite the limited attention in the literature thus far, we
believe that the authorizer and enforcer roles are an important
aspect of the continued maturation of protected search systems;
see Section V-A for additional discussion.
Threats: There are two types of entities that may pose
security threats to a database: a valid user known as an insider
who performs one or more of the roles, and an outsider who
can monitor and potentially alter network communications
between valid users. We distinguish between adversaries that
are semi-honest (or honest-but-curious), meaning they follow
the prescribed protocols but may passively attempt to learn
additional information from the messages they observe, and
those that are malicious, meaning they are actively willing to
perform any action necessary to learn additional information
or influence the execution of the system. An outsider adversary
(even a malicious one) can be thwarted using secure point-to-
point channels. Furthermore, we distinguish between adver-
saries that persist for the lifetime of the database and those
that obtain a snapshot at a single point in time [74]. The bulk
of active research in protected search technology considers
semi-honest security against a persistent insider adversary.
Performance and Leakage: While unprotected databases
are often I/O bound, protected systems may be compute
or network bound. We can measure the performance of a
protected operation by calculating the computational overhead
and the additional network use (in both the number of mes-
sages and the total amount of data transmitted). The type of
cryptographic operations matters as well: whenever possible,
slower public-key operations should be avoided or minimized
in favor of faster symmetric-key primitives.
In order to improve performance, many protected search
systems reveal or leak information during some or all oper-
ations. Leakage should be thought of as an imperfection of
the scheme. The real-ideal security definition is parameterized
by the system’s specific leakage profile, which comprises a
sequence of functions that formally describe all information
that is revealed to each party beyond the intended output. A
security proof demonstrates that the claimed leakage profile is
an upper bound on what is actually revealed to an adversary.
Protected search systems’ security is primarily distinguished
by their leakage profile; our security discussion focuses on
leakage.
While leakage profiles are comprehensive, it is often diffi-
cult to interpret them and to assess their impact on the security
of a particular application (see Section III-B). To help with
this task, the next section identifies common types of leakage.
E. Common Leakage Profiles
This section provides a vocabulary (partially based on
Kamara [75]) to describe common features of leakage system-
atically. While the exact descriptions of leakage profiles are
often complex, their essence can mostly be derived from four
characteristics: the objects that leak, the type of information
leaked about them, which operation leaks, and the party that
learns the leakage.
The following types of objects within a protected search
system are vulnerable to leakage.
1) Data items, and any indexing data structures.
2) Queries.
3) Records returned in response to queries, or other rela-
tionships between the data items and the queries (e.g.,
records that partially match a conjunction query).
4) Access control rules and the results of their application.
Next, we categorize the information leaked from each
object. The leakage may occur independently for each query or
response, or it may depend upon the prior history of queries
and responses. For complex queries like Booleans, leakage
may also depend on the connections between the clauses of a
query. While the details of leakage may depend on the specific
data structures used for representing and querying the data, we
list five general categories of information that may be leaked
from objects, ranked from the least to most damaging. We use
this ranking throughout our discussion of base queries.
# Structure: properties of an object only concealable via
padding, such as the length of a string, the cardinality of
a set, or the circuit or tree representation of an object.
◔ Identifiers: pointers to objects so that their past/future
accesses are identifiable.
G# Predicates: identifiers plus additional information on ob-
jects. Examples include “matches the intersection of 2
clauses within a query” and “within a common (known)
range.”
◕ Equalities: which objects have the same value.
 Order (or more): numerical or lexicographic ordering of
objects, or perhaps even partial plaintext data.
Each of the four database operations may leak information.
During 퐈퐧퐢퐭, the server may receive leakage about the initial
data items. Every party may receive leakage during a 퐐퐮퐞퐫퐲:
the querier may learn about the rules and the current data
items; the server may learn about the query, the rules, and the
current data items; the provider may learn about the query and
rules; and the enforcer may learn about the query and current
data items. During 퐔퐩퐝퐚퐭퐞, the server may receive leakage
about the prior and new data records. During a 퐑퐞퐟퐫퐞퐬퐡, the
server may receive leakage about the current data items.
In a two-party protected search system without 퐔퐩퐝퐚퐭퐞 or
rules it suffices to describe the leakage to the server during 퐈퐧퐢퐭
and 퐐퐮퐞퐫퐲. In this setting, common components of leakage
profiles include: equalities of queries (often called search
patterns); identifiers of data items returned across multiple
queries (often called access patterns); the circuit topology of
a boolean query; and cardinalities and lengths of data items,
queries, and query responses. Dynamic databases must also
consider leakage during 퐔퐩퐝퐚퐭퐞 and 퐑퐞퐟퐫퐞퐬퐡. Three-party
databases with access restrictions must also consider leakage
to the provider and querier about any objects they didn’t
produce themselves.
F. Comparison with Other Approaches
We intentionally define protected database search by its
objective rather than the techniques used. As we will see
in Section III, many software-based techniques suffice to
construct protected database search. Many hardware-based
solutions like [76] are viable and valuable as well; however,
they use orthogonal assumptions and techniques to software-
only approaches. To maintain a single focus in this SoK, we
restrict our attention to software-only approaches.
Within software-only approaches, the cryptographic com-
munity has developed several general primitives that address
all or part of the protected database search problem.
∙ Secure multi-party computation [77]–[79], fully homo-
morphic encryption [80]–[82], and functional encryp-
tion [83] hide data while computing queries on it.
∙ Private information retrieval [12], [84], [85] and oblivious
random-access memory (ORAM) [13] hide access pat-
terns over the data retrieved. On their own, they typically
do not support searches beyond a simple index retrieval;
however, several schemes we discuss in the next section
use ORAM in their protocols to hide access patterns while
performing expressive database queries.
Protected search techniques in the literature often draw heavily
from these primitives, but rarely rely exclusively on one of
them in its full generality. Instead, they tend to use specialized
protocols, often with some leakage, with the goal of improving
performance.
Another related area of research known as authenticated data
structures ensures correctness in the presence of a malicious
server but does not provide confidentiality (e.g., [86]–[90]). In
general, authenticated data structures do not easily compose
with protected database search systems.
III. BASE QUERIES
In this section, we identify basis functions that currently
exist in protected search. The section provides systematic
reviews of the different cryptographic approaches used across
query types and an evaluation of known attacks against them.
Due to length limitations, we focus on the Pareto frontier of
schemes providing the currently best available combinations of
functionality, performance, and security. This means that we
omit any older schemes that have been superseded by later
work. For a historical perspective including such schemes, we
refer readers to relevant surveys [73], [91].
We categorize the schemes into three high-level approaches.
The Legacy Index (or 홻횎횐횊회횢) approach can be used with an
unprotected database server; it merely modifies the provider’s
data insertions and the querier’s requests. However, this
backwards compatibility comes at a cost to security. The
Custom Index (or 홲횞횜횝횘횖) approach achieves lower leakage
at the expense of designing special-purpose protected indices
together with customized protocols that enable the querier and
server to traverse the indices together. We highlight a third
approach Oblivious Index (or 홾횋횕횒횟), which is a subset of
홲횞횜횝횘횖 that provides stronger security by obscuring object
identifiers (i.e., hiding repeated retrieval of the same record).
A. Base Query Implementations
Cryptographic protocols have been developed for several
classes of base queries. The most common constructions
are for equality, range, and boolean queries (which evalu-
ate boolean expressions over equality and/or range clauses),
though additional query types have been developed as well.
Here, we summarize some of the techniques for providing
these functionalities, splitting them based on the approach
used.
The text below focuses on the distinct benefits of each
base query mechanism; Table II systematizes the common
security, performance, and usability dimensions along which
each scheme can be measured. From a security point of view,
we list the index approach, threat model (cf. Section II-D), and
the amount of leakage that the server learns about the data
items during 퐈퐧퐢퐭 and 퐐퐮퐞퐫퐲 (cf. Section II-E). Performance
and usability are described along three dimensions: the scale
of updates and queries that each scheme has been shown
to support, the type and amount of cryptography required
to support updates and queries, and the network latency and
bandwidth characteristics.
1) 홻횎횐횊회횢: Property-preserving encryption [10] produces
ciphertexts that preserve some property (e.g., equality or order)
of the underlying plaintexts. Thus, protected searches (e.g.,
equality or range queries) can be supported by inserting cipher-
texts into a traditional database, without changing the indexing
and querying mechanisms. As a result, 홻횎횐횊회횢 schemes
immediately inherit decades of advances and optimizations in
database management systems.
Equality: Deterministic encryption (DET) [15], [92] ap-
plies a randomized-but-fixed permutation to all messages so
equality of ciphertexts implies equality of plaintexts, enabling
lookups over encrypted data. All other properties are obscured.
However, deterministic encryption typically reveals equalities
between data items to the server even without the querier
making any queries.
Range: Order-preserving encryption (OPE) [93]–[95]
preserves the relative order of the plaintexts, enabling range
queries to be performed over ciphertexts. This approach re-
quires no changes to a traditional database, but comes at
the cost of quite significant leakage: roughly, in addition to
revealing the order of data items, it also leaks the upper
half of the bits of each message [94]. Improving on this,
Boldyreva et al. [95] show how to hide message contents until
queries are made against the database. Mavroforakis et al. [96]
further strengthen security using fake queries. Finally, mutable
OPE [97] reveals only the order of ciphertexts at the expense
of added interactivity during insertion and query execution.
Many 홻횎횐횊회횢 approaches can easily be extended to perform
boolean queries and joins by simply combining the results
of the equality or range queries over the encrypted data.
CryptDB [15] handles these query types using a layered or
onion approach that only reveals properties of ciphertexts as
necessary to process the queries being made. They demonstrate
at most 30% performance overhead over MySQL, though this
value can be much smaller depending on the networking and
computing characteristics of the environment.
홻횎횐횊회횢 approaches have been adopted industrially [98] and
deployed in commercial systems [23]–[35]. However, as we
will explain in Section III-B and Table III, even the strongest
홻횎횐횊회횢 schemes reveal substantial information about queries
and data to a dedicated attacker.
2) 홲횞횜횝횘횖 Inverted Index: Several works over the past
decade support equality searches on single-table databases
via a reverse lookup that maps each keyword to a list of
identifiers for the database records containing the keyword
(e.g., [11], [99]). Newer works provide additional features and
optimizations for such equality searches. Blind Storage [100]
shows how to do this with low communication and a very
simple server, while Sophos [101] shows how to achieve a
notion of forward security hiding whether new records match
older queries (this essentially runs 퐑퐞퐟퐫퐞퐬퐡 on every 퐈퐧퐬퐞퐫퐭).
OSPIR-OXT [18]–[21] additionally supports boolean
queries: the inverted index finds the set of records matching
the first term in a query, and a second index containing a list of
(record identifier, keyword) pairs is used to check whether the
remaining terms of the query are also satisfied. Cryptographi-
cally, the main challenge is to link the two indices obliviously,
so that the server only learns the connections between terms in
the same query. Going beyond boolean queries, Kamara and
Moataz [102] intelligently combine several inverted indices
in order to support the selection, projection, and Cartesian
product operations of relational algebra with little overhead
on top of the underlying inverted index (specifically, only
using symmetric cryptography). They do so at the expense
of introducing additional leakage. Moataz’s Clusion library
implements many inverted index-based schemes [103], [104].
Cash and Tessaro demonstrate that secure inverted indices
must necessarily be slower than their insecure counterparts,
requiring extra storage space, several non-local read requests,
or large overall information transfer [105].
3) 홲횞횜횝횘횖 Tree Traversal: Another category of 홲횞횜횝횘횖
schemes uses indices with a tree-based structure. Here a query
is executed (roughly) by traversing the tree and returning
the leaf nodes at which the query terminates. The main
cryptographic challenge here is to hide the traversal pattern
through the tree, which can depend upon the data and query.
For equality queries, Kamara and Papamanthou [106] show
how to do this in a parallelizable manner; with enough parallel
processing they can achieve an amortized constant query cost.
Stefanov et al. [107] show how to achieve forward privacy
using a similar approach.
The BLIND SEER system [16], [17] supports boolean
queries by using an index containing a search tree whose
leaves correspond to records in the database, and whose
nodes contain (encrypted) Bloom filters storing the set of
all keywords contained in their descendants. A Bloom filter
is a data structure that allows for efficient set membership
queries. To execute a conjunctive query, the querier and
server jointly traverse the tree securely using Yao’s garbled
circuits [108], a technique from secure two-party computation,
following branches whose Bloom filters match all terms in the
conjunction. Chase and Shen [109] design a protection method
based on suffix trees to enable substring search.
Tree-based indices are also amenable to range searches. The
Arx-RANGE protocol [110] builds an index for answering
range queries without revealing all order relationships to the
server. The index stores all encrypted values in a binary
tree so range queries can be answered by traversing this
tree for the end points. Using Yao’s garbled circuits, the
server traverses the index without learning the values it is
comparing or the result of the comparison at each stage. Roche
et al.’s partial OPE protocol [111] provides a different tradeoff
between performance and security with a scheme optimized
for fast insertion that achieves essentially free insertion and
(amortized) constant time search at the expense of leaking a
partial order of the plaintexts.
4) Other 홲횞횜횝횘횖 Indices: We briefly mention protected
search mechanisms supporting other query types: ranking
results of boolean queries [112], [113], calculating the inner
product with a fixed vector [114], [115], and computing the
shortest distance on a graph [116]. These schemes mostly work
by building encrypted indices out of specialized data structures
for performing the specific query computation. For example,
Meng et al.’s GRECS system [116] provides several different
protocols with different leakage/performance tradeoffs that
encrypt a sketch-based (graph) distance oracle to enable secure
shortest distance queries.
5) 홾횋횕횒횟: This class of protected search schemes aims
to hide common results between queries. Oblivious RAM
(ORAM) has been a topic of research for twenty years [117]
and the performance of ORAM schemes has progressed
steadily. Many of the latest implementations are based on
the Path ORAM scheme [118]. However, applying ORAM
techniques to protected search is still challenging [119].
홾횋횕횒횟 schemes typically hide data identifiers across queries
by re-encrypting and moving data around in a data structure
(e.g., a tree) stored on the server. Several equality schemes
use the 홾횋횕횒횟 approach. Roche et al.’s vORAM+HIRB
scheme [120] observes that search requires an ORAM capable
of storing varying size blocks since different queries may
result in different numbers of results. They design an efficient
variable-size ORAM (vORAM) and combine it with a history
independent data structure to build a keyword search scheme.
Garg et al.’s TWORAM scheme [121] focuses on reducing the
number of rounds required by an ORAM-type secure search.
They use a garbled RAM-like [122] construction to build a
two-round ORAM resulting in a four-round search scheme
for equality queries. Moataz and Blass [123] design oblivious
versions of suffix arrays and suffix trees to provide an 홾횋횕횒횟
scheme for substring queries. While offering greater security,
these schemes still tend to be slower than the constructions in
the other classes.
An alternative approach is to increase the number of par-
ties. This approach is taken by Faber et al.’s 3PC-ORAM
scheme [124] and Ishai et al.’s shared-input shared-output sym-
metric private information retrieval (SisoSPIR) protocol [22]
to support range queries. 3PC-ORAM shows how by adding a
second non-colluding server, one can build an ORAM scheme
that is much simpler than previous constructions. SisoSPIR
uses a distributed protocol between a client and two non-
colluding servers to traverse a (per-field) B-tree in a way
that neither server learns anything about which records are
accessed. By deviating from the standard ORAM paradigm,
these schemes are able to approach the efficiency typically
achieved by Custom Index schemes that do not hide access
patterns.
6) Supporting Updates: Another important aspect of secure
search schemes is whether they support 퐔퐩퐝퐚퐭퐞. While update
functionality is critical for many database applications, it is not
supported by many protected search schemes in the 홲횞횜횝횘횖
and 홾횋횕횒횟 categories. Those that support updates do so in
one of two ways. For ease of presentation, consider a newly
inserted record. In most 홻횎횐횊회횢 schemes the new value is im-
mediately inserted into the database index, allowing for queries
to efficiently return this value immediately after insertion. In
many 홲횞횜횝횘횖 schemes, e.g., [16], new values are inserted
into a side index on which a less efficient (typically, linear
time) search can be used. Periodically performing 퐑퐞퐟퐫퐞퐬퐡
incorporates this side index into the main index; however,
due to the cost of 퐑퐞퐟퐫퐞퐬퐡 it is not possible to do this
very frequently. Thus, depending on the frequency and size
of updates, update capability may be a limiting functionality
of protected search. In particular, a major open question is
to build protected search capable of supporting the very high
ingest rates typical of NoSQL databases. We return to this
open problem in Section V. Roche et al. [111] take a step in
this direction with a 홲횞횜횝횘횖 scheme for range queries capable
of supporting very high insert rates.
Table II systematizes the protected search techniques dis-
cussed in this section along with some basic information
about the (admittedly nuanced) leakage profiles that they have
been proven to meet. There are several correlations between
columns of the table; some of these connections reveal funda-
mental privacy-performance tradeoffs whereas others simply
reflect the current state of the art. To provide one example in
the latter category: most 홻횎횐횊회횢 systems leak information at
ingestion, whereas most 홲횞횜횝횘횖 only leak information after
queries have been made against the system. The recent Arx-
EQ [14] bucks this trend by requiring the client to remember
the frequency of each keyword.
B. Leakage Inference Attacks
In this subsection and Table III, we summarize leakage
inference attacks that can exploit the leakage revealed by a
protected search system in order to recover some information
about sensitive data or queries. Hence, this section details the
real-world impact of the leakage bounds and threat models
depicted in Table II. The two tables are connected via a JOIN
on the “푆 leakage” columns: a protected search scheme is
affected by an attack if the scheme’s leakage to the server is
at least as large as the attack’s required minimum leakage.
We stress that leakage inference is a new and rapidly
evolving field. As a consequence, the attacks in Table III
only cover a subset of leakage profiles included in Table II.
Additionally, this section merely provides lower bounds on the
impact of leakage because attacks only improve over time.
We start by introducing the different dimensions that char-
acterize attack requirements and efficacy. Then, we sketch a
couple representative attacks from the literature. Finally, we
describe how the provider and querier should use these attacks
to inform their choice of a search system that adequately
protects their interests.
1) Attack Requirements: We classify attacks along four
dimensions: attacker goal, required leakage, attacker model,
and prior knowledge. The attacker is the server in all of the
attacks we consider, except for the Communication Volume
Attack of [125], which can be executed by a network observer
who knows the size of the dataset. We expect future research
on attacks using leakage available to other insiders.
a) Attacker Goal: Current attacks try to recover either
a set of queries asked by the querier (query recovery) or the
data being stored at the server (data recovery).
b) Required Leakage: This is the leakage function that
must be available to the attacker. We focus on the common
leakage functions on the dataset and responses identified in
Section II-E. Examples include the cardinality of a response
set, the ordering of records in the database, and identifiers
of the returned records. Some attacks require leakage on the
entire dataset while others only require leakage on query
responses.
c) Attacker Model: Current inference attacks assume one
of two attacker models. The first is a semi-honest attacker as
discussed in Section II-D. The second is an attacker capable
of data injection: it can create specially crafted records and
have the provider insert them into the database. Note that
this capability falls outside the usual malicious model for the
server. The attacker’s ability to perform data injection depends
on the use case. For example, if a server can send an email to
a user that automatically updates the protected database, this
model is reasonable. On the other hand, it might be harder to
insert an arbitrary record into a database of hospital medical
records.
d) Attacker Prior Knowledge: All current attacks assume
some prior knowledge, which is usually information about the
stored data but may include information about the queries
made. Attack success is judged by the ability to learn informa-
tion beyond the prior knowledge. The following types of prior
knowledge (ordered from most to least information) help to
execute attacks.
 Contents of full dataset: the data items contained in the
database. The only possible attacker goal in this case is
query recovery.
◕ Contents of a subset of dataset: a set of items contained
in the database. Both attacker goals are interesting in this
case.
G# Distributional knowledge of dataset: information about the
probability distribution from which database entries are
drawn. For example, this could include knowledge of the
frequency of first names in English-speaking countries.
This type of knowledge can be gained by examining
correlated datasets.
◔ Distributional knowledge of queries: information about
the probability distribution from which queries are drawn.
As above, this might be knowledge that names will
be queried according to their frequency in the overall
population.
# Keyword universe: knowledge of the possible values for
each field.
Naturally, attacks that require full knowledge of the data are
more effective; the reasonableness of this assumption should
be evaluated for each use case.
2) Attack Efficacy: We evaluate attack efficacy qualitatively
in terms of three metrics: 1) the runtime of the attack,
including time required to create any inserted records; 2)
the sensitivity of the recovery rate to the amount of prior
knowledge; and 3) the keyword universe size attacked. Note
that the strength of an attack is strongly application-dependent;
an attack that is devastating on one dataset may be completely
ineffective on another dataset.
Table III characterizes currently known attacks based upon
their requirements and efficacy. All of the attacks described in
the table only require modest computing resources.
3) Attack Techniques: Leakage inference attacks against
protected search systems have evolved rapidly over the last
few years, with Islam et al. [132] in 2012 inspiring many
other papers. Most of the attacks in Table III rely on the
following two facts: 1) different keywords are associated with
different numbers of records, and 2) most systems reveal
keyword identifiers for a record either at rest (e.g., DET [15]
reveals during 퐈퐧퐢퐭 if records share keywords) or when it is
returned across multiple queries (e.g., Blind Seer [16] reveals
during 퐐퐮퐞퐫퐲 which returned records share keywords). To
give intuition for how these attacks work we briefly summarize
two entries of Table III.
Cash et al.’s [128] Count Attack is a conceptually simple
way to exploit this information. Assume the attacker has full
knowledge of the database and is trying to learn the query.
The attacker sees how many records are returned in response
to a query. If that number is unique it can identify the query.
Furthermore, by identifying the query, the attacker learns that
every returned record is associated with that keyword.
For example, suppose the attacker learns the first query was
for LastName = ‘Smith’. Now consider a second query for
an unknown first name. The query does not return a unique
number of records, so the method above cannot be used.
Suppose that FirstName=‘John’ and FirstName=‘Matthew’
both return 1000 records. The attacker can also check how
many records are in common with the previous query. This
creates an additional constraint, for example there may be
100 records with name ‘John Smith’ but only 10 records
with name ‘Matthew Smith’. By checking record overlap with
the previously identified query, the attacker can identify the
queried first name. This attack iteratively identifies queries
and uses them as additional constraints to identify unknown
queries.
Cash et al.’s attack is fairly simple and performs well if the
keyword universe sizes is at most 5000. However, it requires a
large portion of the dataset to be known to the attacker. With
80% of the dataset known to the attacker, Cash et al. [128]
yield a 40% keyword recovery rate.
Zhang et al. [127] extend the Count Attack to a malicious
adversary setting, allowing a server to inject a set of con-
structed records. This capability greatly improves keyword
recovery. By carefully constructing a small number of these
records (e.g., nine records for a universe of 5000 keywords),
it is possible to search the keyword universe and identify
the keyword. Although the records are fairly large, the attack
extends if the database only allows a limited number of
keywords per data record. This attack recovers more keywords
than the attack of Cash et al.: 40% of the data must be leaked
to obtain a 40% keyword recovery rate.
4) Discussion: The provider and querier rely upon pro-
tected search to protect themselves against the server, or
anyone who compromises the server. Our systemization of
attacks shows that they should consider the following four
questions before choosing a protected search technique to use.
∙ How large is the keyword universe?
∙ How much of the dataset or query keyword universe (and
corresponding frequency) can the attacker predict?
∙ Can an attacker reasonably insert crafted records?
∙ Does the adversary have persistent access to the server,
or merely a snapshot of it at a single point in time?
Answers to the first three questions depend upon the intended
use case. For example, a system with a smaller leakage profile
may be necessary in a setting where the keyword universe is
small and the attacker has the ability to add records. A system
with a larger leakage profile may suffice in a setting where the
keyword universe is very large.
The fourth question pertains to adversaries who compromise
the server. 홻횎횐횊회횢 schemes tend to leak information about the
entire database to the server. Thus, using the terminology of
Grubbs et al. [74], they are susceptible to an adversary who
only gets a snapshot of the database at some point in time.
In contrast, 홲횞횜횝횘횖 schemes tend to reveal information about
records only during record retrieval or index modification as
part of the querying process, so they require a persistent
adversary who can observe the evolution of the database state
over time. (We note however that many Boolean schemes have
additional leakage about data statistics for the entire database.)
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Arx-EQ [14] 홻횎횐횊회횢 2 — G# # ◔  ✔ G#      legacy compliant
Kamara-Papamanthou [106] 홲횞횜횝횘횖 2 — G# # ◔  — —  # #   parallelizable
Blind Storage [100] 홲횞횜횝횘횖 2 — G# # ◔  ✔ G#  G#  G#  low 푆 work
Sophos (Σo휙o휍) [101] 홲횞횜횝횘횖 2 — G# # ◔  ✔ G# # G#    퐑퐞퐟퐫퐞퐬퐡 w/ 퐈퐧퐬퐞퐫퐭
Stefanov et al [107] 홲횞횜횝횘횖 2 — G# # ◔  ✔ G#  # #   퐑퐞퐟퐫퐞퐬퐡 w/ 퐈퐧퐬퐞퐫퐭
vORAM+HIRB [120] 홾횋횕횒횟 2 — G# # #  ✔   # # # ◔ history independ.
TWORAM [121] 홾횋횕횒횟 2 — G# # #  — — G# # # G# ◔ const round
3PC-ORAM [124] 홾횋횕횒횟 3 G# G# # #  ✔ ◔  # # # ◔ dual 푆
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DET [15], [92] 홻횎횐횊회횢 2 — G# ◕ ◕  ✔   G# G#   supports JOINs
BLIND SEER [16], [17] 홲횞횜횝횘횖 3   # G# G# ✔  G# G# # # ◔ hide field, 푟푖’s
OSPIR-OXT [18]–[21], [104] 홲횞횜횝횘횖 3  G# # G#  ✔  G# G# G# ◕  excels w/ small 푟1
Kamara-Moataz [102] 홲횞횜횝횘횖 2 — G# # G# # — — G# G# #  ◔ relational SPC
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OPE [93]–[95] 홻횎횐횊회횢 2 — G#    ✔       leak some content
Mutable OPE [97] 홻횎횐횊회횢 2 — G#    ✔ G#  # # # G# interactive
Partial OPE [111] 홲횞횜횝횘횖 2 — G# #   ✔ G#    G#  fast insertions
Arx-RANGE [110] 홲횞횜횝횘횖 2 — G# # G#  ✔ G# G# # #  # non-interactive
SisoSPIR [22] 홾횋횕횒횟 3 G# G# # # # ✔     # ◔ split, non-colluding 푆
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GraphEnc1 [116] 홲횞횜횝횘횖 2 — G# G# ◔ # ✔ G#     ◔ approx. graph dist.
GraphEnc3 [116] 홲횞횜횝횘횖 2 — G# G# G# # ✔ G# #     approx. graph dist.
Chase-Shen [109], [126] 홲횞횜횝횘횖 2 —  # G# # ✔ ◔    G#  substring search
Moataz-Blass [123] 홾횋횕횒횟 2 — G# # #  ✔   # # # ◔ substring search
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF THE SECURITY, PERFORMANCE, AND USABILITY OF BASE QUERIES. 푄 AND 푆 DENOTE THE QUERIER AND THE SERVER, RESPECTIVELY. WE PRESUME THAT THE
ADVERSARY KNOWS THE DATABASE SIZE 푑 AND THE LENGTH OF EACH RECORD. FOR SYSTEMS THAT EITHER DO NOT SUPPORT INSERT OR USE A SIDE INDEX, THE INSERT COST IS
THE AMORTIZED COST OF ADDING A SINGLE RECORD DURING 퐈퐧퐢퐭. LEGENDS FOR EACH COLUMN FOLLOW. IN ALL COLUMNS EXCEPT “INIT/QUERY LEAKAGE,” BUBBLES THAT ARE
MORE FILLED IN REPRESENT PROPERTIES THAT ARE BETTER FOR THE SCHEME.
SCALE TESTED UPDATABLE THREATS DATA SENT INIT/QUERY LEAKAGE
 – BILLIONS
G#– MILLIONS
◔– THOUSANDS
 – INSERT IN MAIN INDEX
G#– BUILD SIDE INDEX
#– NOT SUPPORTED
 – MALICIOUS
G#– SEMI-HONEST
(BEYOND RESULTS)
 – CONSTANT
G#– ADDITIVE POLYLOG(푑)
◔– MULT. POLYLOG(푑)
#– EVEN MORE
(SEE SECTION II-E)
 – ORDER/CONTENTS
◕– EQUALITY
G#– PREDICATE
◔– IDENTIFIER
#– STRUCTURE
TYPE OF CRYPTO CRYPTO OPS PER RECORD ROUND TRIPS
 – SYMMETRIC
G#– BATCHED OR PRE-
COMPUTED PUBLIC-KEY
#– PUBLIC-KEY
 – CONSTANT
G#– # KEYWORDS
#– LOGARITHMIC
 – 1
◕– 2
G#– CONSTANT
#– LOGARITHMIC
Required
푆 leakage
Required attack
conditions
Attack efficacy
Attacker goal Init Query Ability
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# # — ◔  ? # Communication Volume Attack [125]
# ◔ ✔ # # # # Binary Search Attack [127]
# ◔ — ◔  ? # Access Pattern Attack [125]
# ◔ — ◕ G#   Partially Known Documents [128]
# ◔ ✔ ◕ G# #  Hierarchical-Search Attack [127]
# ◔ —  G#   Count Attack [128]
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y # ◔ — G#   G# Graph Matching Attack [129]
◕ — — G# # ? # Frequency Analysis [130]
◕ — ✔ G# # ?  Active Attacks [128]
◕ — — ◕ # ?  Known Document Attacks [128]
 — — G# # #  Non-Crossing Attack [131]
TABLE III
SUMMARY OF CURRENT LEAKAGE INFERENCE ATTACKS AGAINST PROTECTED SEARCH BASE QUERIES. 푆 IS THE SERVER AND THE ASSUMED ATTACKER FOR ALL ATTACKS LISTED.
푆 LEAKAGE SYMBOLS HAVE THE SAME MEANING AS IN TABLE II. EACH ATTACK IS RELEVANT TO SCHEMES IN TABLE II WITH AT LEAST THE 푆 LEAKAGE SPECIFIED IN THIS
TABLE. SOME ATTACKS REQUIRE THE ATTACKER TO BE ABLE TO INJECT DATA BY HAVING THE PROVIDER INSERT IT INTO THE DATABASE. LEGENDS FOR THE REST OF THE
COLUMNS FOLLOW. IN ALL COLUMNS EXCEPT “KEYWORD UNIVERSE TESTED,” BUBBLES THAT ARE MORE FILLED IN REPRESENT PROPERTIES THAT ARE BETTER FOR THE SCHEME
AND WORSE FOR THE ATTACKER.
PRIOR KNOWLEDGE RUNTIME (IN # OF KEYWORDS) SENSITIVITY TO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE KEYWORD UNIVERSE TESTED
 – CONTENTS OF FULL DATASET
◕– CONTENTS OF A SUBSET OF DATASET
G#– DISTRIBUTIONAL KNOWLEDGE OF DATASET
◔– DISTRIBUTIONAL KNOWLEDGE OF QUERIES
#– KEYWORD UNIVERSE
 – MORE THAN QUADRATIC
G#– QUADRATIC
#– LINEAR
 – HIGH
#– LOW
? – UNTESTED
 – > 1000
G#– 500 TO 1000
#– < 500
In summary, each protected search approach has a distinct
leakage profile that results in qualitatively different attacks. If
queries only touch a small portion of the dataset or the adver-
sary only has a snapshot, the impact of leakage from 홲횞횜횝횘횖
systems is less than from 홻횎횐횊회횢 schemes. If queries regularly
return a large fraction of the dataset, this distinction disappears
and an 홾횋횕횒횟 scheme may be appropriate. Recently, Kellaris
et al. [125] showed an attack on 홾횋횕횒횟 schemes, but it requires
significantly smaller database and keyword universe sizes than
attacks against non-홾횋횕횒횟 schemes.
Open Problems: The area of leakage attacks against pro-
tected search is expanding. Published attacks consider attack-
ers who insert specially crafted data records but have not
considered an attacker who may issue crafted queries. Fur-
thermore, all prior attacks have considered the leakage profile
of the server. Future attacks should consider the implications
of leakage to the querier and provider. Current attacks have
targeted Equality and Range queries; we encourage the study
of leakage attacks on other query types such as Boolean
queries.
On the reverse side, it is important to understand what
these leakage attacks mean in real-world application scenarios.
Specifically, is it possible to identify appropriate real-world
use-cases where the known leakage attacks do not disclose too
much information? Understanding this will enable solutions
that better span the security, performance, and functionality
tradeoff space.
Lastly, on the defensive side we encourage designers to
implement 퐑퐞퐟퐫퐞퐬퐡 mechanisms. 퐑퐞퐟퐫퐞퐬퐡 mechanisms have
only been implemented for Equality systems.
IV. EXTENDING FUNCTIONALITY
A. Query Composition
We now describe techniques to combine the base queries
described in Section III (equality, Boolean, and range queries)
to obtain richer queries. We restrict our attention to techniques
that are black box (i.e., they do not depend on the implemen-
tation of the base queries).
As a general principle, schemes that support a given query
type by composing base queries tend to have more leakage
than schemes that natively support the same query type as
a base query. However, using query composition, a scheme
that supports the necessary base queries can be extended
straightforwardly to support multiple query types, whereas
supporting those all as base queries requires significant effort.
Thus, we see value in advancing both base and composed
queries.
Table IV summarizes the techniques we describe below.
In the table and the text, we cite the first work proposing
each approach, though we note that several ideas appear to
have been developed independently and concurrently. We defer
the description of string queries (substrings and wildcards) to
Appendix A.
1) Equality using range: Equality queries can be supported
using a range query scheme. To obtain the records equal to 푎,
the querier performs a range query for the range [푎, 푎].
2) Disjunction of equalities/ranges using equality/range:
Disjunctions of equalities or ranges can be supported using
an equality or a range scheme, respectively. To obtain the
records that equal any of a set of 푘 keywords 푤1,… , 푤푘, the
querier can perform an equality query for each keyword 푤푖
and combine the results. Similarly, to retrieve all records that
are in any of 푘 ranges, the querier can perform a range query
for each range and combine the results. This approach reveals
to the server the leakage associated with each equality or
range query, e.g., the exact or approximate number of records
matching each clause (not just the number of records matching
the disjunction overall).
3) Conjunction of equalities using equality: Conjunctions
of equalities can be supported using an equality scheme. To
supporting querying for records that match all of the keywords
푤1,… , 푤푘, one builds an equality scheme containing 푘-tuples
of keywords. The querier then performs an equality search on
the 푘-tuple representing her query to retrieve the records that
contain all of those keywords. The storage for this approach
grows exponentially with 푘 but is viable for targeted keyword
combinations or a small number of fields.
4) Stemming using equality: Stemming reduces words to
their root form; stemming queries allow matching on word
variations. For example, a stemming query for ‘run’ will also
return results for ‘ran’ and ‘running’. The Porter stemmer
is a widely used algorithm [135], [136]. Stemming can be
supported easily by using the stemmed version of keywords
at both initialization and query time, and thus performing the
match using a single equality query.
5) Proximity using equality: Proximity queries find values
that are ‘close’ to the search term. Li et al. [137] support
proximity queries by building an equality scheme associating
each neighbor of any record with its set of neighbors in the
dataset at initialization; a proximity query is then an equality
query, which will return a record if it matches the queried value
or is a neighbor of it. Boldyreva and Chenette [133] improve
on the security of this scheme by revealing only pairwise
neighbor relationships instead of neighbor sets. They also pad
the number of inserted keywords to the maximum number of
neighbors. This solution multiplies storage by the maximum
number of neighbors of a record. If disjunctive searches are
permitted, one can trade off storage space with the number of
terms in the search.
Another approach uses locality-sensitive hashing [138],
[139], which preserves closeness by mapping ‘close’ inputs
to identical values and ‘far’ inputs to uncorrelated values.
Proximity queries can be supported by inserting the output of
a locality-sensitive hash as a keyword in an equality scheme.
Returning only ‘close’ records requires matching the output
of multiple hashes. Parameters vary widely depending on the
notion of closeness. This approach has been demonstrated for
Jaccard distance [140] and Hamming distance [137], [141]–
[144].
6) Small-domain range query using equality [134]: To
support range queries on a searchable attribute 퐴 with domain
퐷, we build two equality-searchable indices. The first index
Composed Query Base Query Calls Additional Storage Leakage Work
1. Equality (EQ) 1 range none Same as range —
2. Disjunction (OR) of 푘 EQs (or
ranges)
푘 EQs (or ranges) none Identifiers of records matching each clause, if EQ leaks
≥ ◔
—
3. Conjunction (AND) of 푘 EQs 1 EQ
(훽
푘
)
Same as EQ —
4. Stemming 1 EQ 1 Identifiers of records sharing stem, if EQ leaks ≥ ◔ —
5. Proximity 1 EQ 퓁 Identifiers of neighbor pairs, if EQ leaks ≥ ◔ [133]
6. Range w/ small domain (2 + 푟) EQs 1 No leakage if refresh between queries [134]
7. Range OR of (2 log푚) EQs log푚 Distributional info, if EQ leaks ≥ ◔ [16]
8. Negation AND of 2 ranges 1 Same as OR of ranges [16]
9. Substring (휌 = 휅) 1 EQ 훼 − 휅 + 1 Identifiers of records sharing 휅-grams, if EQ leaks ≥ ◔ [22]
10. Substring (휌 ≤ 휅) 1 range 훼 − 휅 + 1 Same as range, on 휅-grams [22]
11. Anchored Substring (휌 ≥ 휅) AND of (휌 − 휅 + 1) EQs 훼 − 휅 + 1 If EQ leaks ≥ ◔, rec. ids. w/ 휅-grams in same positions;
if AND leaks # clauses, 휌
[18]
12. Substring OR of (훼 − 휅 + 1) ANDs
of (휌 − 휅 + 1) EQs
훼 − 휅 + 1 If EQ leaks ≥ ◔, rec. ids. w/ 휅-grams in same positions;
if AND leaks # clauses, 휌
[18]
13. Anchored Wildcard AND of (휌 − 휅 + 1) EQs 훼 − 휅 + 1 If EQ leaks ≥ ◔, rec. ids. w/ 휅-grams in same positions;
if AND leaks # clauses, 휌
[18]
14. Wildcard OR of (훼 − 휅 + 1) ANDs
of (휌 − 휅 + 1) EQs
훼 − 휅 + 1 If EQ leaks ≥ ◔, rec. ids. w/ 휅-grams in same positions;
if AND leaks # clauses, 휌
[18]
TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF QUERY COMBINERS USING EQUALITY (EQ), CONJUNCTION (AND), DISJUNCTION (OR), AND RANGE BASE QUERY TYPES. STORAGE IS GIVEN
AS ADDITIONAL STORAGE BEYOND THAT REQUIRED FOR THE BASE EQUALITY OR RANGE QUERIES, AS A MULTIPLICATIVE FACTOR OVER THE BASE STORAGE.
COMPOSED QUERY LEAKAGE DEPENDS ON THE LEAKAGE OF THE BASE QUERIES USED; THE TABLE GIVES THE COMPOSED QUERY LEAKAGE IF THE BASE
EQUALITY SCHEME LEAKS IDENTITIES. “ANCHORED” REFERS TO A SEARCH THAT OCCURS AT EITHER THE BEGINNING OR THE END OF A STRING.
BOOLEAN NOTATION PROXIMITY, RANGE NOTATION STRING NOTATION
푘 = # OF CLAUSES IN BOOLEAN 퓁 = MAX # OF NEIGHBORS OF A RECORD 휅 = LENGTH OF GRAMS
훽 = MAX # OF KEYWORDS PER RECORD 푚 = SIZE OF DOMAIN 휌 = LENGTH OF QUERY STRING
푟 = # QUERY RESULTS 훼 = MAX LENGTH OF DATA STRING
(PADDED IF NECESSARY)
maps each value 푎 ∈ 퐷 to the number of records in the
database smaller than 푎 and the number of records larger than
푎. With two equality queries into this index, the querier can
learn the location of the lower and upper bounds of a range
query. The second index is an ordered list of records sorted
by 퐴, from which the client reads the relevant subset.
This approach requires blinding factors to prevent the client
from learning the positions of the results while still being able
to search the second index [134]. Also, this approach only
works for attributes with small domain, since the first index
has size proportional to the domain size.
7) Large-domain range using equality and disjunction [16],
[134]: Range queries can be performed over exponential size
domains via range covers, which are a specialization of set
covers that effectively pre-compute the results of canonical
range queries that would be asked during a binary search of
each record. For instance, consider the domain 퐷 = [0, 8) with
size 푚 = 8. To insert a record with attribute 퐴 = 3, we insert
keywords corresponding to each of the canonical ranges [0, 8),
[0, 4), [2, 4), and [3, 4). Range queries are split into canonical
ranges; for instance, the range [2, 5) would be split into [2, 4)
and [4, 5). Combining this technique with disjunctions yields
range queries [16].
Demertzis et al. [145] provide a variety of range cover
schemes with different tradeoffs between leakage, storage,
and computation. At the extremes, they can support constant
storage with query cost linear in the range size, or 푚2
multiplicative storage with constant-sized keyword queries.
They recommend a balanced approach similar to [16], [134],
although their recommended scheme has false positives.
8) Negations using range and disjunction [16]: As above
consider an ordered domain 퐷 with minimum and maximum
values 푎푚푖푛 and 푎푚푎푥, respectively. To search for all records
not matching 퐴 = 푎, compute a disjunction of the queries
[푎푚푖푛, 푎) and (푎, 푎푚푎푥].
B. The Functionality Gap
We now review gaps in query functionality based on cur-
rent protected base and combined queries. Our discussion is
divided among the three query bases from Section II-A.
a) Relational Algebra: Cartesian product, which corre-
sponds to the JOIN keyword in SQL, has been demonstrated
in 홻횎횐횊회횢 schemes. The one 홲횞횜횝횘횖 scheme that supports
Cartesian product is the work of Kamara and Moataz [102],
but their scheme does not support updates.
The JOIN keyword makes a system relational. Secure JOIN
is a crucial capability for protected search systems. The key
challenge is to create a data structure capable of linking
different values that reveals no information to any party. This
challenge also arises in Boolean 홲횞횜횝횘횖 systems. Systems
overcome this challenge by placing values that could be linked
in a single joint data structure. It is difficult to scale this
approach to the JOIN operation as the columns involved
are not known ahead of time (and there are many more
possibilities).
Open Problem: Support secure Cartesian product using
홲횞횜횝횘횖 and 홾횋횕횒횟 approaches.
b) Associative Arrays: The main workhorse of associa-
tive arrays is the ability to quickly add and multiply arrays.
홻횎횐횊회횢 schemes have shown how to support limited addition
through the use of somewhat homomorphic encryption. There
is extensive work on private addition and multiplication using
secure computation. However, this problem has not received
substantial attention in the protected search literature. We
see adaptation of (parallelizable) arithmetic techniques into
protected search as a key to supporting associative arrays.
Open Problem: Incorporate secure computation into pro-
tected search systems to support array (+,×).
In addition, associative arrays are often constructed for
string objects. In this setting, multiplication and addition
are usually replaced with the concatenate function and an
application-defined ‘minimum’ function that selects one of the
two values. Finding the minimum is connected to the compar-
ison operation. The comparison operation has been identified
as a core gadget in the secure computation literature [146],
[147]. We encourage adaptation of this gadget to protected
search.
Open Problem: Support protected queries to output the
minimum of two strings.
c) Linear Algebra: The main gap in supporting linear al-
gebra is how to privately multiply two matrices. This problem
is made especially challenging as for different data types the
addition (+) and multiplication (×) operations may be defined
arbitrarily. Furthermore, linear algebra databases store data as
sparse matrices. Access patterns to a sparse matrix may leak
about the contents. This problem has begun to receive attention
in the learning literature [148] as matrix multiplication enables
many linear classification approaches. However, current work
requires specializing storage to a particular algorithm, such as
shortest path [116], [149].
Open Problem: Support efficient secure matrix multiplica-
tion and storage.
V. FROM QUERIES TO DATABASE SYSTEMS
In addition to search, a DBMS enforces rules, defines
data structures, and provides transactional guarantees to an
application. In this section, we highlight important components
that are affected by security and need to be addressed to enable
a protected search system to become a full DBMS. We then
discuss current protected search systems and their applicability
for different DB settings.
A. Controls, Rules and Enforcement
Classical database security includes a broad set of control
measures, including access control, inference control, flow
control, and data encryption [150].
Access control assigns a principal such as a user, role,
account, or program privileges to interact with objects like
tables, records, columns, views, or operations in a given
context [151]. Discretionary access control balances usability
with security and is used in most applications. Mandatory
access control is used where a strict hierarchy is important
and available for individuals and data. Inference control is used
with statistical databases and restricts the ability of a principal
to infer a fact about a stored datum from the result returned by
an aggregate function such as average or count. Flow control
ensures that information in an object does not flow to another
object of lesser privilege. Data encryption in classical systems
is used for transmitting data from the database back to the
client and user. Some systems also encrypt the data at rest
and use fine-grained encryption for access control [152]. These
techniques are covered in most database textbooks.
A new complementary approach is called query con-
trol [153]. Query control limits which queries are acceptable,
not which objects are visible by a user. As an example, a
user may be required to specify at least five columns in a
query, ensuring the query is sufficiently “targeted.” It enables
database designers to match legal requirements written in this
style. Query control can be expressed using a query policy,
which regulates the set of query controls.
Most current protected search designs do not consider either
an authorizer or enforcer. Integrating this functionality is an
important part of maturing protected search and complements
the cryptographic protections provided by the basic protocols.
B. Performance Characterization
Database system adoption depends on response time on
the expected set of queries. Databases are highly tuned,
often creating indices on the fly in response to queries.
This makes fair and fast evaluation difficult. To address this
challenge, we developed a performance evaluation platform.
Our platform has been open-sourced with a BSD license
(https://github.com/mit-ll/SPARTA). Design details can be
found in [154]–[156]. It has been used to test protected search
systems at scales of 10TB. Prior works [16], [17], [19], [22]
report performance numbers generated by our platform. While
the platform has been used to evaluate SQL-style databases
it was designed with reusability and extensibility in mind to
allow generalization to other types of databases.
Our platform evaluates: 1) integrity of responses and
modifications (when occurring individually and while other
operations are being performed) and 2) query latency and
throughput under a wide variety of conditions. The system can
vary environmental characteristics, the size of the database,
query types, how many records will be returned by each
query, and query policy. Each of these factors can be measured
independently to create performance cross-sections.
In our experiments, we found protected search response time
depends heavily on:
1) Network capacity, load, and number of records returned
by a query. Protected search systems often have more
rounds of communication and network traffic than un-
protected databases.
2) The ordering of terms and subclauses within a query.
Query planning is difficult for protected search systems
as they do not know statistics of the data. Protected
search generates a plan based on only query type.
3) The existence and complexity of rules (query policy and
access control). Protected search systems use advanced
cryptography like multi-party computation to evaluate
these rules, resulting in substantial overhead.
C. User Perceptions of Performance
We conducted a human-subjects usability evaluation to
further the understanding of current protected search usabil-
ity. This evaluation considered the performance of multiple
protected search technologies and the perception of perfor-
mance by human subjects (our procedure was approved by
our Institutional Review Board). In this evaluation, subjects
interacted with different protected search systems through an
identical web interface. Here, we focus on thoughts shared by
participants during discussion. (An informal overview of our
procedure is in Appendix B.)
Our participants discussed several themes that are salient
for furthering the usability of protected search:
∙ Participants cared more about predictability of response
times than minimizing the mean response time. When re-
sponse times were unpredictable, participants were unsure
whether they should wait for a query to complete or do
something else.
∙ Participants felt the protected technologies were slower
than an unprotected system. Participants felt this perfor-
mance was acceptable if it gave them access to additional
data, but did not want to migrate current databases to
a protected system. Note that this feedback is from end
users, not administrators.
∙ Participants expected performance to be correlated with
the number of records returned and the length of the
query. Participants were surprised that different types of
queries might have different performance characteristics.
D. Current Protected Search Databases
Some protected search systems have made the transition
to full database solutions. These systems report performance
analysis, perform rule enforcement, and support dynamic data.
These systems are summarized in Table V. CryptDB repli-
cates most DBMS functionality with a performance overhead
of under 30% [15]. This approach has been extended to NoSQL
key-value stores [157], [158]. Arx is built on a NoSQL key-
value store called mongoDB [63]. Arx reports a performance
overhead of approximately 10% when used to replace the
database of a web application (ShareLatex). Blind Seer [16]
reports slowdown of between 20% and 300% for most queries,
while OSPIR-OXT [18] report they occasionally outperform a
baseline MySQL 5.5 system with a cold cache and are an order
of magnitude slower than MySQL with a warm cache. The
SisoSPIR system [22] reports performance slowdown of 500%
compared to a baseline MySQL system on keyword equality
and range queries.
Given these performance numbers, we now ask which
solution, if any, is appropriate for different database settings.
1) Relational Algebra without Cartesian product:
CryptDB, Blind Seer, OSPIR-OXT, and SisoSPIR all provide
functionality that supports most of relational algebra except
for the Cartesian product operation. These systems offer
different performance/leakage tradeoffs. CryptDB is the
fastest and easiest to deploy. However, once a column is used
in a query, CryptDB reveals statistics about the entire dataset’s
value on this column. The security impact of this leakage
should be evaluated for each application (see Section III-B).
Blind Seer and OSPIR-OXT also leak information to the
server but primarily on data returned by the query. Thus,
they are appropriate in settings where a small fraction of
the database is queried. Finally, SisoSPIR is appropriate if
a large fraction of the data is regularly queried. However,
SisoSPIR does not support Boolean queries, which is limiting
in practice.
2) Full Relational Algebra: CryptDB is the only system for
relational algebra that supports Cartesian product. (As stated,
while Kamara and Moataz [102] support Cartesian product,
but do not support dynamic data.)
3) Associative Array - NoSQL Key-Value: The Arx sys-
tem built on mongoDB provides functionality necessary to
support associative arrays. In addition, other commercial sys-
tems (e.g., Google’s Encrypted BigQuery [29]) and academic
works [157], [158] apply 홻횎횐횊회횢 techniques to build a NoSQL
protected system.
Blind Seer, OSPIR-OXT, and SisoSPIR have sufficient
query functionality to support associative arrays. However,
their techniques concentrate on query performance. Associa-
tive array databases often have insert rates of over a million
records per second. The insert rates of Blind Seer, OSPIR-
OXT, and SisoSPIR are multiple orders of magnitude smaller.
Suppose a record is being updated. In an unprotected system
this causes a small change to the primary index structure.
However in the protected setting, if only a few locations
are modified the server may learn about the statistics of
the updated record. This creates a tension between efficiency
and security. Efficient updates are even more difficult if the
provider does not have the full unprotected dataset.
Open Problem: Construct 홲횞횜횝횘횖 and 홾횋횕횒횟 techniques
that can handle millions of inserts per second.
To support very large insert rates, NoSQL key-value stores
commonly distribute the data across many machines. This
introduces the challenge of synchronizing queries, updates, and
data across these machines. This synchronization is difficult
as none of the servers are supposed to know what queries,
updates, or data they are processing!
Open Problem: Construct protected search systems that
leverage distributed server architectures.
4) Linear Algebra and Others: No current protected search
system supports the linear algebra basis used to implement
complex graph databases. In addition, as federated and poly-
store databases emerge it will be important to interface be-
tween different protected search systems that are designed for
different query bases.
Inherent Limitations: Protected search systems are still in
development, so it is important to distinguish between tran-
sient limitations and inherent limitations of protected search.
Protected search inherently reduces data visibility in order
to prevent abuse. To achieve high performance under these
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System Supported Operations Properties Features
CryptDB [15]   #  # #    홻횎횐횊회횢 2     # ◕  
Arx [14]  # #  # #    홲횞횜횝횘횖 2 # # # # # G# G#
BLIND SEER [16], [17]     # # # #  홲횞횜횝횘횖 3 #  # #  G# G#
OSPIR-OXT [18]–[21], [103], [104]       # #  홲횞횜횝횘횖 3 #  # #  G# ◕
SisoSPIR [22]  #    # # # # 홾횋횕횒횟 3 # # # #  # G#
TABLE V
THIS TABLE SUMMARIZES PROTECTED SEARCH DATABASES THAT HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED AND EVALUATED AT SCALE. THE Supported Operations COLUMNS
DESCRIBE THE QUERIES NATURALLY SUPPORTED BY EACH SCHEME. Properties AND Features COLUMNS DESCRIBE THE SYSTEM AND AVAILABLE
FUNCTIONALITY. FINALLY Leakage AND Performance DESCRIBE THE WHOLE, COMPLEX SYSTEM, AND ARE THEREFORE RELATIVE (VS. THE MORE PRECISELY
DEFINED VALUES FOR INDIVIDUAL OPERATIONS USED EARLIER).
conditions, many design decisions such as the schema and the
choice of which indices to build must be made before data is
ingested and stored on the server. In particular, if an index has
not been built for a particular field, then it simply cannot be
searched without returning the entire database to the querier.
In general, it is not possible to dynamically permit a type of
search without retrieving the entire dataset.
Additionally, if the database malfunctions, debugging efforts
are complicated by the reduced visibility into server processes
and logs. More generally, protected search systems are more
complicated to manage and don’t yet have an existing com-
munity of qualified, certified administrators.
Throughout this work we’ve identified a few transient limita-
tions that can (and should!) be mitigated with future advances.
Each potential user must make her own judgment as to whether
the value of improved security outweighs the performance
limitations.
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Several established and startup companies have commercial-
ized protected search. Most of these products today use the
홻횎횐횊회횢 technique, but we believe both 홲횞횜횝횘횖 and 홾횋횕횒횟
approaches will find their way into products with broad user
bases.
Governments and companies are finding value in lacking
access to individuals’ data [159]. Proactively protecting data
mitigates the (ever-increasing) risk of server compromise,
reduces the insider threat, can be marketed as a feature, and
frees developers’ time to work on other aspects of products
and services. The recent HITECH US Health Care Law [160]
establishes a requirement to disclose breaches involving more
than 500 patients but exempts companies if the data is en-
crypted: “if your practice has a breach of encrypted data [...]
it would not be considered a breach of unsecured data, and
you would not have to report it” [161].
Protected database technology can also open up new mar-
kets, such as those cases where there is great value in recording
and sharing information but the risk of data spills is too high
For example, companies recognize the value of sharing cyber
threat and attack information [162], but uncontrolled sharing
of this information presents a risk to reputation and intellectual
property.
This paper provides a snapshot of current protected search
solutions. There is currently no dominant solution for all use
cases. Adopters need to understand system characteristics and
tradeoffs for their use case.
Protected databases will see widespread adoption. Protected
search has developed rapidly since 2000, advancing from linear
time equality queries on static data to complex searches on
dynamic data, now within overhead between 30%-500% over
standard SQL.
At the same time, the database landscape is rapidly chang-
ing, specializing, adding new functionality, and federating
approaches. Integrating protected search in a unified design
requires close interaction between cryptographers, protected
search designers, and database experts. To spur that integra-
tion, we describe a three pronged approach to this collabora-
tion: 1) developing base queries that are useful in many appli-
cations, 2) understanding how to combine queries to support
multiple applications, and 3) rapidly applying techniques to
emerging database technologies.
DBMSs are more than just efficient search systems; they
are highly optimized and complex systems. Protected search
has shown that database and cryptography communities can
work together. The next step is to transform protected search
systems into protected DBMSs.
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APPENDIX A
SUBSTRING AND WILDCARD QUERY COMBINERS
9) Bounded-length substring using keyword equality [22]:
Searches for substrings of a fixed length 휅 can be supported
simply by inserting all length-휅 substrings (휅-grams) into an
equality-searchable index during initialization. Given a field
with maximum length 훼, this techniques requires adding 훼−휅
keywords during insertion and making one keyword search
during query execution.
10) Short substring using range [22]: By inserting the 휅-
grams into a range index, queries for substrings of length up
to 휅 can also be supported. We explain by example: one can
query for the two-character string “hi” by searching for the
range [ℎ푖푎, ℎ푖푧] in an index of length-3 substrings.
11) Anchored substring using conjunction [18]: We now
consider the converse of the above situation: supporting
searches of long substrings of length at least 휅, with storage
overhead decreasing in 휅. We begin with an “anchored” search,
where the substring occurs either at the beginning or end of
the string.
By way of example, suppose we wish to support substring
searches on the record 푎 =“teststring”. In a conjunction-
searchable index, we insert 휅-grams of the string along with
their location (1, “tes”), (2, “est”), . . . , (8, “ing”). Now to
search for all records containing “test” the client asks for all
records matching both (1, “tes”) and (2, “est”). Searching from
the end of the string can be accomplished using negative
indexing; using (-1, “ing”), (-2, “rin”), (-3, “tri”), . . . , (-8,
“tes”) in the above example.
12) Substring using disjunction of conjunctions [18]:
Removing the anchoring restriction from the above technique
requires the use of disjunctions, since the starting location
of the substring is unknown. To find the substring “test” the
querier must search for a conjunction of (푖, “tes”) and (푖+1,
“est”) for any starting position 푖. The number of terms in this
formula depends on the maximum string length.
13) and 14) Wildcard using conjunctions [18]: The above
technique also supports single-character wildcard queries. For
instance, to search for “tes_str”, the client asks for a con-
junction of (1, “tes”) and (5, “str”). Note that the 휅-gram
length of letters is required on either side of the wildcard. This
technique can be extended for unanchored queries as above,
and it supports multiple character wildcards by incrementing
the expected positions of the 휅-grams.
APPENDIX B
PROCEDURE FOR PILOT STUDY
We installed and configured multiple protected search sys-
tems. For each, we ingested ten million records of real
application data, and conducted sessions with 10 users over a
ten-day period. Our Institutional Review Board reviewed our
protocols and questionnaires, determined that they represented
a minimal risk, and approved the procedure. Software for the
procedure resided in an Amazon Web Services (AWS) [163]
network. Data was drawn from a genuine application source
and was converted to a single, static table with over one
hundred columns and ten million records.
Participants had a mix of technical and non-technical back-
grounds, with six men and four women. All participants
had prior experience interacting with web interfaces that
use database backends to present results. Participants were
aware that they were using different systems but systems were
identified only by a single letter. Participants were not given
any information about the capabilities of the technologies.
Each participant took part in three types of sessions, each
of which lasted 30 minutes: 1) training on the web interface;
2) scripted interaction with each of the technologies; and
3) exploratory sessions with each of the technologies. Users
interacted with the secure database technology through a
web application which included a visual query builder which
queried the underlying secure database. Participants interacted
with the visual query builder to create queries. Then, the web
server submitted the query to the protected search system.
